Part 2:
A very specific problem in Russian Empire was inadequate transportation to link the urban/capitalist/industrial economy centered in Petrograd and Moscow with the vast and populous countryside where small scale, low tech farming prevailed. This was a problem directly in a big way affecting the food supply and military problems I mentioned. At the outbreak of the war, Russia had about 1/10th the railroad track per square kilometer that Austria and Germany had. With rail traffic being diverted to the war effort, urban supply problems became even more critical.
Anyway, by the winter of 1916–17, all the above problems had gotten worse. People in Petrograd were beginning to face real starvation. The February overthrow of the Tsar began as mass protests demanding basically food, started by women workers on International Women’s Day of that year. Then something happened. Cossack troops in the capital began siding with the people in a number of incidents against the police. The protests grew. Tsar Nicholas ordered the protests repressed and the Petrograd garrison began arming to drown the uprising in blood. The night before this was to start, a key military unit armed and organized itself, then mutinied the following day. Other troops joined the people’s side and within days Nicholas was forced to abdicate.
The provisional government of 1917 was able to solve none of the problems that they inherited that had given rise to the revolution, including the war, food supply and relations with the peasants.
“The Russian Revolution was different in that the SDP split between reformists and revolutionaries–and the revolutionaries prevailed. After the reformist Mensheviks (minoritarians) proved their utter inadequacy at defending the revolution against the white armies, …”
The issue here was control and discipline within the Imperial army. The reformist–socialist Alexander Kerensky became Prime Minister I believe in June after mounting protests against the “capitalist ministers” in the provisional government. His government legalized soldier’s committees at the front, in theory with the right to do anti–war agitation; and appointed General Kornilov, a general with a reputation for maintaining discipline (by things like hanging disobedient troops) as chief of staff of the army.
The army went into a summer offensive with realistic prospects of making significant military gains. They were better armed and equipped than ever before. Several things happened over a few weeks:
1– the troops managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory
2– Mass anti–war and anti–government protests broke out, especially in Petrograd. the Bolsheviks were gaining ground
3– the Ukraine’s leading political body (the Rada) declared the right to self determination
In the late summer the government lauched a crackdown against the Bolsheviks.
These events set the stage for the Kornilov revolt, in which the Bolsheviks took the lead in organizing mass defense of the capital against forces commanded by Kornilov who were marching on the city.
An interesting side discussion developed on Black Orchid Collective blog (above). My comments:
A couple points on the Frank and Ben discussion:
On the one hand I’m seeing that how to deal with the united front was solved 90–110 years ago. On the other hand, that the key theoretical questions for the working class are answered in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
The problem with social democracy is an expression of the struggle between reform and revolution; in which a range of views need to be addressed. One is the view that revolution is impossible. Another is the view that revolution will be a cure worse than the disease. Another is that things just aren’t bad enough to require such a drastic solution. A revolutionary ideological struggle within a united front needs to credibly address these issues. I don’t think these issues are posed in the same way as they were 90–110 years ago.
Basically Frank correctly points out that the key to whether a revolutionary party can really act in a revolutionary way is a political question, not that leaderships just go bad for no reason. The limitation I’m seeing here is that problems will continually come up that can not be solved on the basis of a fixed body of theory. I think what has happened in the CPUSA in the 30′s, USSR in the 20′s etc. is that problems came up for which there were no good or “correct” answers. The civil war and the related collapse of the economy in the Soviet Republics in the first case. This means that theory really needs to be advanced, usually when conditions are most difficult. Significant sections of workers and their allies need to learn to do theory in the sense of generating new theory for new situations in the world. Just on the learning level this is different from lets say a class at a vocational school or something. I don’t equate theory with ideology. Good theory should translate well across a reasonable range of ideologies.
As far as organization and information technology issues: I think organizational forms flow from whats happening in society, and learning theoretically and practically what this means. I don’t think there is any fixed body of knowledge that is the solution. The IT question is not just a new opportunity for how people can organize– it’s most importantly a new rapidly evolving set of forms and configurations of capitalism globally. I would start from that and then see where that leads us in terms of organization. One problem is that the working class does not control the IT.
My initial thought is that I agree with Ben in terms of political transparency on issues of policy, direction, theory and strategic conception of revolutionary activities. In many practical areas involving more immediate strategy and tactics (like where will a revolutionary team hook up at a demo, and much broader extensions of this type of question as thing develop), a whole different security question arises. A related concern is that as events in society move towards crises with revolutionary implications, the whole parameter of state repression will likely change, and any party or network or whatever will need to quickly adapt.
If the class enemy can know what the organized revolutionaries are planning and doing on a large scale in real time in a revolutionary situation, it’s not looking good for the revolution
Another issue with IT in relation to a mass revolutionary formation is the signal to noise problem.
One source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_aristocracy
this is a basic overview. Another source: http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/129
has more background and a critique of the labor aristocracy thesis. The weak point of the analysis is that it bases its analysis of imperialist super-exploitation in the third world solely on figures for direct foreign investment (DFO) from imperialist countries into oppressed countries. This may not be the main form of capitalist investment in the third world (one issue is debt structure). This weakness may undermine the central thesis of the article
Four revolutionary activists met– four very diverse perspectives– lively atmosphere and discussion. Us older revolutionary activists didn’t get our nap time. We came up with several questions each (9–12 total– I didn’t count) that we are grappling with for ongoing discussion. Some issues framing the discussion are working class alternatives to business (i.e.– bourgeois dominated reformist) unions and the occupy (decolonize) movement/struggle.
Some key questions I picked up on involve:
How to influence all aspects of movement in a revolutionary way, developing a revolutionary core and how to correctly relate (or strategically not relate) to reformist forces and demands.
Supporting people of color in the revolutionary movement.
A cluster of questions and issues related to democracy in the movement and in a future society.
The role of theory in all this.
I’ll be posting specifically on theory of democracy, not this post though. Two resources I’m looking at: Alain Badiou and Robert Dahl.
anton666black 